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Lessening the Constraints
on the Export of Coal:
Some Structural Suggestions
BY MICHAEL B. Bmm*
INTRODUCTION

In recent years the rising prices of oil and natural gas have
sparked renewed interest in coal as an energy resource. The attractiveness of coal has been further enhanced by the desire of
the industrialized nations to reduce their dependence on oil supplies controlled by a few unpredictable countries in the Middle
East and Africa. Thus, coal is viewed not only as a less expensive
source of energy, but also as a means of providing energy security.
The rising world demand for coal makes the United States,
which possesses one-fourth of the world's recoverable coal supplies, the most likely candidate to lead the coming explosion in
international coal trade. In order to maintain its position as the
world's preeminent coal supplier and to increase its ability to
meet rising demand, however, the United States must act, and
act quickly, to resolve a number of pressing problems that
threaten to undercut its competitive position.
First, ports within the United States are generally too shallow to accommodate the huge, deep-draft colliers which will
dominate oceanborne coal transport in coming years. At present,
our ports simply cannot handle these vessels. Unless they can do
so soon, foreign buyers may be forced to go elsewhere because
they cannot move United States coal with the larger-volume
ships which help keep the price down.
Second, the high costs of transporting coal from the mines to
the ports undermines the competitiveness of American coal on
the world market. Two-thirds of the coal mined in the United
. Partner in the firm of Hunton & Williams, Washington, D.C. B.S. 1970, Georgetown University; J.D. 1973, George Washington University. This Article was prepared
with the assistance of Tara Gallagher.
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States is transported by rail. Almost all of the coal bound for export from the East Coast is moved to the ports by railroads. The
lack of alternative means of transportation, together with recent
legislation largely deregulating the railroads, has resulted in escalating rail rates, which in turn have caused rising coal prices. Unless this trend toward higher domestic transportation costs can be
halted, the United States' world market share may diminish or at
least remain stagnant.
Third, the anticipated growth in our competitors' ability to
meet worldwide coal demand makes time of the essence. Other
major current or potential coal exporters, including Australia,
Canada, South Africa and the Soviet Union, are positioning
themselves to gain an increased share of the world market. If we
do not immediately begin to solve the problems hindering the expansion of our capacity to export coal at competitive prices, the
future loss of revenue to the United States from lost sales could
total billions of dollars.
What is needed to promote coal trade in the United States is a
comprehensive program capable of resolving these problems effectively and expeditiously. Such a program must be initiated
and implemented through federal legislation on two fronts.
First, legislation must be enacted which ensures the rapid dredging of ports; this would require initial federal funding. Second,
legislation must be passed which encourages the construction and
operation of coal slurry pipelines. Once this legislation is enacted, government regulatory machinery must be pushed into
high gear to ensure that the myriad of approvals necessary under
other federal statutes can be obtained without delay. Without
these actions it is unlikely that American coal will remain competitive and readily available to the world market throughout the
next decade and beyond.
I.

THE EXPORT MARKET FOR COAL

Coal has traditionally been an important source of energy for
industrialized nations. In the late 1800s coal fueled the industrial
revolution that swept Europe and the United States. In the early
1900s, however, petroleum and natural gas began to eclipse the
dominance of coal. These energy sources frequently were easier
to transport and to use in industrial processes than coal. What
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had been a gradual shift in the early part of this century became
dramatic between 1940 and 1973, when coal's share of the world
energy market dropped precipitously from forty-nine percent in
1940 to twenty-nine percent in 1973.'
In the 1970s the oil-importing nations began to experience
the effects of monopolization of supplies by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Oil prices increased
ten-fold in that decade, 2 and supply availability became enmeshed in political questions centered in the Middle East. As a
result, industrial nations, particularly in the West, became concerned that nearly exclusive reliance upon oil was politically,
economically and militarily undesirable. Coal was turned to as
an energy resource because it was cheaper, more plentiful and
available from a variety of sources. Thus, by 1979, coal was once
again on an upswing and was used to satisfy thirty-three percent
of the world's primary energy requirements. 3
World demand for steam coal in particular is expected to increase rapidly in the future. In 1981, the Interagency Coal Export Task Force predicted that Western Europe, Japan, Hong
Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, which combined to buy 88 million short tons of steam coal in 1979, would import 140 to 166
million short tons by 1985, 236 to 280 million tons by 1990 and
475 to 565 million tons by 2000. 4 These areas have relatively
small reserves of easily recoverable coal and will be forced to the
import market to obtain the coal needed for electric power and
other industries.
The United States possesses the world's greatest supply of
coal. Our coal resources consist of approximately 1.7 trillion tons
I U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY
(Jan. 1981) [hereinafter cited as COAL TASK FORCE REPORT].

COAL TASK FORCE

2Id.
3 Id. But cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979, § 3, at 1, col. 6 (Despite the world trend
toward increased reliance upon coal and the rising world price of oil, the American imports of OPEC oil doubled from 2.4 million barrels per day to 4.9 million barrels per day
between 1973 and 1979). One response to this situation was President Jimmy Carter's National Energy Plan, which called for greater use of coal. See EXECuTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING. xii, xiv-xxi (1977).
4 COAL TAK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 35. See Israel Turns to Coal, THE
ENERGY DALY Aug. 14, 1981, at 4. By 1990, Israel also will be a major importer of coal for
its Hadera and Ashkelon power stations. When completed, these plants together will consume about 8.5 million tons of imported coal each year. Id.
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and possibly as much as 4 trillion tons. 5 Roughly 438 billion tons
of this coal can be mined economically with existing technology. 6
These supplies make the United States, already the largest exporter of coal in the world, the prime candidate to lead the
movement toward rapidly escalating worldwide use of coal. Of
the 776.3 million short tons of bituminous and subbituminous
coal produced by this country in 1979, 65.2 million tons of bituminous coal, or 8.1% of the country's total production, was exported.7 In 1980, in part due to labor problems in Australia and
Poland, American exports rose 38.5% from 1979 levels to 91.7
million tons. In 1981, American exports of steam and matallurgical coal totaled 110 million tons, representing 13.5% of total
production within the United States. 8 Exports for 1982 are nearly
the same.
Of course, these rather optimistic statements could be taken
by some as inconsistent with the current gloomy market picture.
Demand is lessening. Huge quantities of coal are stockpiled in
Europe. In the fall of 1980, more than 160 colliers were anchored
at Norfolk, Virginia, waiting to load coal. By the spring of 1982,
that figure had dropped to seven. 9
Much of this slackening of demand, however, can be attributed directly to the current oil surplus and price decline, as
well as to the recession now gripping virtually all European economies. Neither of these factors is likely to last long. Thus, even if
final figures for 1982 exports do not exceed those of 1981, and
even if they do not increase substantially until 1985 or later,
there is every reason to be optimistic about long-term prospects
for American coal exports. By 1990, the United States' share of
the world steam coal market is projected to be thirty-eight percent. ' 9
Notwithstanding this country's huge coal reserves, there is no
shortage of competition on the world market. Australia, for

5 NATIONAL COAL ASS'N, A FoREcAsT FOR U.S. COAL INTHE 1980's 2 (Jan. 1981).

6

1d.

7 Id.
8 NATIONAL COAL ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL COAL REVIEW 10 (Feb. 12,1982).
9 Washington Post, June 7,1982 (Business Magazine), at 7.
10 CoAL TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note 1, at 6.
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example, has large coal reserves which have enabled it to become
the third largest coal exporter in the world." Australia presently
exports approximately 38 million tons of coal per year, enough to
capture eighteen percent of the world market. 12 The International Energy Agency predicts that Australia will be able to expand
its steam coal exports to 120 million tons annually in the 1990s,
thereby supplanting the United States as the world's largest coal
exporter. 13

II.

CONSTRAINTS ON EXPANSION OF UNITED STATES COAL EXPORTS

The projection of the United States' increased share of the
world coal market in the future will not be fulfilled as a matter of
course. Although the United States has sufficient coal reserves to
meet higher production rates, at least through the next two centuries, 4 there are three major constraints on the industry's ability
to expand coal exports at prices which can compete on the world
market. If left unremedied, these constraints could severely damage the industry's ability to achieve that goal.
First, the cost of coal mining is increased by current health,
safety and environmental regulations which often impose excessively rigid requirements upon surface and underground mining
activities. These increased costs are reflected in proportionately
higher prices. Second, the cost of transporting coal from the
mines to the ports is often substantial. The virtual monopolization of the coal transport market by the railroads means rates are
largely free from the restraining influence of competition.
Domestic transportation costs are passed through to the foreign
coal purchaser, making our coal less attractive on the world
market. Third, the price of our coal rises still higher because our
ports lack the depth needed to accommodate large coal colliers
and do not have the storage and loading capacity to handle adequately the present level of coal exports. This forces buyers of

11 Australia: More Coal, Oiland Gas Than You Can Shake a Stick At, THE ENERGY
DAjLY Aug. 25, 1981, at 2.

121d. COAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supranote

13 Id.
14 Id. at 63.

1, at 6.

KENTUCKY LAW JouNALV

[Vol. 71

United States coal to use smaller ships for carrying coal and to
wait in line for days, weeks or even months to load it.
In short, by the time United States coal is actually loaded
onto ships bound for importing countries, its price has become
unnecessarily inflated. In order to understand how this inflation
can be controlled, it is necessary to examine each of these factors
which contribute to the inflation of coal prices.
A.

The Costs of EnvironmentalRestrictionson Coal Mining

Enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA)'5 began a new chapter in federal mining
regulation. Its impact on the mining industry has been pervasive.
Under the statute, an operator must obtain a permit before engaging in surface mining.' 6 As part of the permit application, an
operator must prepare and submit a detailed reclamation plan.17
Before the permit is issued, the applicant must file a performance
bond to cover mining and reclamation activities. 18 Any permit
that is issued must require the operator to satisfy a host of environmental performance standards, including restoration to approximate original contour, revegetation and disposition of excess spoil.' 9
Of course, this brief description merely touches upon the requirements of this complex regulatory scheme. The point, however, is that compliance with the SMCRA requirements alone
can add substantially to the cost of coal. Other environmental
regulations that apply to coal mining activities also increase these
costs. The Reagan administration has withdrawn and is reconsidering some of the more stringent SMCRA regulations. Even.

15 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. III 1979). The facial constitutionality of the SMCRA
was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See Bratt, Surface Mining in Kentucky and
McGraw, Surface Mining Primacyfor Kentucky: The Legal Implications,published else-

where in this issue for extensive discussions of challenges to and applications of the
SMCRA.
16 30 U.S.C. § 1256 (Supp. 111979).
17 Id. § 1258.
18Id. § 1259.
19 Id. § 1265(b) (3), (19), (22).
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when this process is completed, the federal government's massive
environmental protection structure will continue to impose significant economic costs on coal mining. These costs certainly will
be reflected in the prices paid by foreign customers.
B.

TransportationCosts

Most coal, whether bound for export or for use in this country, is transported by rail . 0 In 1975, railroads moved 418 million
tons of coal, or sixty-five percent of our domestic coal traffic. 21 In
1977, two-thirds of our coal production was hauled by rail.21
Eighty-five percent of the coal carried by railroads is "captive,"
meaning that no alternative means of transportation are available. In regions such as the West, where inland waterways are
not available and long hauls make truck competition impractical, the "captive" figure rises to ninety-seven percent. 3
As the dominant force in the coal transportation market, railroads have been able to set freight charges relatively free from
the constraints imposed by competition. Indeed, for many years
the principal worry of the railroads was not competition, but,
rather, was the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which
was originally established to ensure that rail rates were "reasonable and just" so as to promote the "public interest."2
Recent legislation, however, has precluded ICC review of
most rail rates. Beginning with the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976,21 and continuing with the Stag-

20 COAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 75.
21 SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES and SENATE COMM. ON COM-

MERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., NATIONAL ENERGY TRANSPORTATION VOL. III-ISSUES AND PROBLEMS, 57 (Comm. Print 1978).
2 NATIONAL COAL ASSrN, STUDY OF CAPTIVE COAL SHIPMENTS BY RAIL FOR

1977 2

(May 1977).
23 H.R. REP. No. 423, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982); S. REP. No. 528, 97th

Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).
2 See The Cullom Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 418, 41 Stat. 485 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
2
5 Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45
U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.).
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gers Rail Act of 1980,2 Congress has given the railroads great
freedom in setting rates. The general rule established by this legislation is that a rail carrier "may establish any rate for transportation .... 27That rate must be proven reasonable only if the
ICC determines that a rail rate exceeds a given price/cost ratio
and that a rail carrier has "market dominance" over the transportation in question.28 "Market dominance" exists only if there is
"an absence of effective competition from other carriers or modes
of transportation for the transportation to which a rate applies."29
The ICC recently made it more difficult for shippers to prove
"market dominance" by eliminating regulations which had provided rebuttable presumptions of such dominance in certain circumstances.o While the ICC will continue to consider geographic considerations and product competition as evidentiary
tools in determining market dominance, the elimination of rebuttable presumptiohs and the substitution of general guidelines
makes it more difficult for shippers to satisfy their burden of
proving market dominance.
Even if market dominance can be shown, the Staggers Act
strongly favors the railroad over the shipper in judging the
reasonableness of rates. The Act makes clear that the reasonableness of rates must be judged in light of the need to ensure the financial health of the railroads. 31 Therefore, on the rare occasions

2 Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C., 45 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.).
27 49 U.S.C. § 10701a(a) (Supp. IV. 1982).
2 Id. § 10701a(b)(1). The burden of demonstrating that the rate is below the
price/cost ratio and thus reasonable rests upon the carrier. Id. § 10701a(b) (2)(3).
29 Id. § 10709(a) (emphasis added). The shipper carries the burden of showing "market dominance." Moreover, the ICC is precluded from making a finding of market dominance if the proportion of total revenues of the carrier to total variable costs is less than
specified amounts. Id. § 10709(d) (1)(B) (ii),
(2).
30 See 46 Fed. Reg. 35,098 (1981).
3'49 U.S.C. § 10701a(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). See H. CONF.REP. No. 1430, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD.NEWS 3978, 4111. ("[7The
overall purpose of the [Staggers Rail] Act is to provide, through financial assistance and
freedom from unnecessary regulation, the opportunity for railroads to obtain adequate
earnings to restore, maintain and improve their physical facilities while achieving the financial stability of the national rail system").
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when the ICC even considers the reasonableness of rail rates, it
will tend to give the railroads the benefit of the doubt in close
cases.
The impact which transportation costs can have upon the
competitiveness of coal exports was underscored by the Norfolk
& Western Railroad's March of 1981 petition to the ICC requesting that the Commission issue a proposed rulemaking to exempt
from its jurisdiction rail rates for export coal moving to Atlantic
and Gulf Coast ports. On September 4, 1981, the ICC issued a
notice of proposed exemption in Ex Parte No. 346 (Sub-No. 7),
"seeking comment on the merits of exempting all export coal traffic through all U.S. ports from some or all [ICC] regulations." 32
On December 21, 1981, thirty companies and associations, including several overseas customers and the Departments of State
and Commerce, filed comments with the ICC opposing the
exemption proposal. Among other things, those comments argued that: 1) export coal is a captive commodity and needs protection from abuse of market power by the railroads, and 2)
exemption of export rates from regulation, including prevention
of discrimination, would seriously jeopardize construction of
new coal port facilities by non-rail interests. 3
This statutory and regulatory setting is likely to cause transportation costs to inflate the export cost of United States coal
even more. The costs of moving coal from the mine to the ports
for export may comprise as much as one-third of the price of the
coal F.O.B. United States piers. 34 In 1980, European purchasers
of American coal paid fifty to sixty dollars per short ton for deliv-

32 46 Fed. Reg. 44,529 (1981) (emphasis added).
33 Verified Statement of National Economic Research Associates, Inc., ICC Docket
No. 38,272 (Dec. 18, 1981).
34 COAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 76. The cost of transportation as a percentage of the total cost of coal can be expected to increase in the future. For example,
since the Staggers Rail Act was enacted, domestic coal transportation costs have rocketed.
In examining the economic feasibility of slurry pipelines for coal transport, the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources concluded that, on a nationwide basis, the
cost of transporting coal by rail from the mine to the power plant is approximately equal
to the price of the coal or about one half of the total delivered cost and that in some extreme instances, 70 % of the delivered cost of coal can be attributed to the cost of transportation. S. REP. No. 528, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).
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ery to Amsterdam, Rotterdam or France." United States rail
costs amounted to fifteen dollars per ton of that total delivered
price.A Given the present control of the railroads over coal transportation and the general absence of government supervision,
the contribution of transportation costs to the overall export price
of coal will remain significant and, indeed, is likely to increase. 37
C.

PortCosts: Directand Indirect

Our port system has been another source of inflationary pressure upon exported coal prices. This pressure is reflected first in
the direct costs associated with inadequate coal export facilities.
During 1979 and 1980, the upsurge of demand for United States
coal strained coal storage and loading facilities beyond their capabilities. They were simply unable to handle the number of
ships coming in to pick up coal for export. The unfortunate result
was that long lines of these ships waited for weeks, sometimes
months, before gaining access to our ports to load their cargo. At
Hampton Roads, Virginia,for example, the average daily cost to
ships waiting to load was as much as $10,000 per day s This
backlog increased the price of coal to foreign buyers between $6
and $6.50 per ton. 39
The coal industry is, of course, working diligently to overcome these problems. Coal loading capacity portside has expanded from 65 million tons in January 1980 to 100 million tons
in mid-1981. Loading capacity is expected to increase even more
significantly in the future to meet expected demand. Pending
construction of necessary loading facilities, other measures such

35 COAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supranote 1, at 76.
6 Id.
37 See THE ENERGY DAILY, Aug. 25, 1981, at 3. The impact of transportation costs

upon the price of United States coal, if left unchecked, could force even some domestic
consumers to turn to alternative sources. Australian coal can be shipped to the United
States on vessels of 200,000 DWT and because of internal U.S. transportation costs, compete with our coal for buyers in this country. Interview with G. Paul Phillips, executive director of the Australian Mining Industry Council.
38 COAL TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
39ld.
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as implementation of advanced vessel registration procedures
and use of transportation contracts by the railroads have helped
to reduce vessel lines and waiting times.
While private industry is constructing the handling facilities
needed to bring down the costs of loading delays, other additional costs are being indirectly imposed on our exported coal that are
more serious and long-lasting. Sophisticated knowledge of economics is not required to understand that the larger the volume
of coal carried each time it is delivered to a foreign port, the
lower the price of that coal. A 150,000 DWT ship, for example,
can deliver coal from East Coast ports to Europe for approximately $6 a ton less than a ship of 60,000 DWT capacity.40 This
analysis has led the Interagency Coal Export Task Force to conclude that "[l]owering the delivered cost of coal by employing
larger ships would bring the United States closer to the possibility
of selling in a price competitive range." 4' Not surprisingly, foreign buyers are increasingly relying upon coal colliers in excess of
100,000 DWT capacity for ocean transport of coal. Estimates are
that by 1990 a large percentage of world 42coal traffic will be
moved by ships of 120,000 DWT and larger.
The coal importing nations, and many exporting ones, are responding to this phenomenon by deepening their ports to accommodate these large bulk coal carriers. Australia, for example,
now has only one port capable of handling a 120,000 DWT vessel. 43 But by 1985, at least three additional Australian ports will
be deep enough to accommodate ships of this size.44
Unfortunately, the United States has not kept pace with its
competitors in this regard. No coastal port improvement projects
have been authorized since 1976. Our East and Gulf Coast coal

40

Id. at 9.

411d. at 10.
42
1d. at 9. A Maritime Administration report indicates that the daily cost per ton of
transporting coal on a 150,000 DWT ship is 31.8 cents as compared with an average daily
cost of 52.7 cents for a 60,000 DWT vessel. Id. at 88 (Table 5-14).
43 Id. at 50.
44 127 CONG. REc. S6472 (daily ed. June 18, 1981) (chart entitled New Developmerts-Coal Loading Terminals Including UpgradingExisting Ports,introduced by Sen.
Warner).
45
Id. at S6471 (remarks of Sen. Warner).
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ports are only forty to forty-five feet deep and generally cannot
handle over 80,000 DWT ships unless special tidal conditions are
present. 46 The deepest Atlantic Coast port is Hampton Roads,
which has a depth of forty-five feet. 47 Nor is this problem limited
to our East and Gulf Coast ports. Los Angeles is the only West
Coast ocean loading terminal capable of handling vessels of over
100,000 DWT. 48 These depth limitations mean that larger coal
ships either simply cannot dock in United States harbors or can
do so only if they depart partially loaded.
Since the cost of ocean transportation is a significant part of
the total delivered cost of United States coal abroad, the inability
of foreign buyers to take advantage of the economies of scale
achievable through use of larger ships when buying American
coal makes that coal less attractive on the world market. 49 Regardless of whether American ports can accommodate them,
ships in excess of 100,000 DWT will be used to haul nearly onehalf of ocean coal traffic by 1990. 0 If these ships can be loaded
only in Canada, Australia and South Africa, foreign buyers will
likely purchase their coal from those countries rather than the
United States.
III.

EXPANDING UNITED STATES COAL EXPORTS:
A THREE-PRONGED ATTACK

According to one estimate, total worldwide demand for
steam and metallurgical coal by importing countries will grow to
more than 200 million tons by 1985 and more than 400 million
tons by 1990. 51 In competing to supply the coal to meet this demand, the United States enjoys certain advantages. In addition'
to its enormous coal reserves and productive capacity, the United
States offers a stable and reliable long-term source of supply to

46 COAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
47 ld. at

86.

48 127 CONG. REc. S6471 (daily ed. June 18, 1981) (chart entitled Existing Ocean

Loading Terminals Capable of Handling Vessels of Over 100,000 DWT, introduced by
Sen. Warner).
49 COAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 87.

50 Id. at 89 (Table 5-15).
51 Id.
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prospective buyers. Further, this country has long-established

trade relationships with virtually all of the major coal importers.
At the same time, the constraints outlined above must be removed to enable the United States to capitalize on its advantages.
This goal can largely be accomplished by a three-fold program
involving both private industry and government action. First,
private industry must significantly expand coal storage and loading facilities at East, Gulf and West Coast ports. As mentioned
earlier, this activity is already underway and does not require
significant federal assistance. Second, Congress must enact and
the administration must implement legislation authorizing an expedited dredging program, with streamlined environmental reviews, to deepen United States ports. Third, Congress must pass
legislation encouraging prompt construction of coal slurry pipelines.
The remaining discussion focuses on the two aspects of this
program that require federal action, without which the efforts of
private industry are unlikely to achieve desired results.
A. PortDredgingLegislation
The federal government traditionally assumed the burden of
dredging ports and harbors. In the past, dredging projects have
been planned and performed by the Army Corps of Engineers
and paid for out of the general treasury. 52 This work has invariably been slow and expensive. Some projects have taken more
than twenty years from the beginning of planning to the completion of construction, at a cost of up to $500 million per project.0
Indeed, the average time from authorization of a study to completion of construction for the thirty-six most recent port projects
undertaken by the Corps was 24.4 years.5 Given these time and

cost constraints, federal legislation is essential if an effective port
dredging program is to be implemented within the time frame
needed to ensure that foreign competition doesn't capture the

127 CONC. REc. S6472 (daily ed. June 18,1981) (remarks of Sen. Warner).
53 Fact Sheet, Administration Coal Export Policy, U.S. DEP. OF COMMERCE
July 17,1981, at 2 [hereinafted cited as AdministrationCoal Export Policy].
54 127 CONG. REC. S6472 (daily ed. June 18, 1981) (remarks ifSen. Warner).
52

NEWS,
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lion's share of the world coal market.-, Recognizing this fact,
more than thirty bills were introduced in the 97th Congress
authorizing port dredging projects to be undertaken on an expedited basis.
These bills differed widely on the important issue of financing methods. Senate Bill 809, introduced by Senator Stafford of
Vermont at the request of the Administration, would have permitted federal funds to be used to finance dredging projects only
if government expenditures were totally repaid.-5 Under Senate
Bill 809, expenses incurred by the Army Corps of Engineers in
conducting port dredging operations would be paid by the federal government, provided that local governments repay the
funds with interest within the life of the project, but in no event
later than fifty years. Local governments, in turn, would be
authorized to recover their reimbursement costs by establishing a
fee collection program for the vessels using the improved ports.M
In those cases where local authorities agreed to repay the federal
government without benefit of federal financing, Senate Bill 809
would have authorized port improvements to be undertaken by
the Corps without further Congressional authorization. 9
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee rejected the financing scheme in Senate Bill 809 and reported out
Senate Bill 1692, the National Harbors Improvement and Maintenance Act of 1981, on December 15, 1981.10 This bill incorporated features of several of the bills examined by that Committee. Senate Bill 1692 was not brought to the floor of the Senate

S5
S. REP. No. 454, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982) ("Not a single major navigation improvement has been initiated in the past decade. No project has received Congressional authorization in over five years. Today, by any measure, channel construction in
the U.S. port system lags behind that in the rest of the world').
5 S. 809, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See also H.R. 2959, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) (these bills are untitled).
5 S. 809, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1, 4(b) (1981); H.R. 25959, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
§§ 1, 4(b) (1981).
M S. 809 at § 6(a); H.R. 2959 at 6(a).
59 S. 809 at § 9; H.R. 2959 at § 9 (in other words, if local port authorities could raise
their own funds through bonds or other measures, they could bypass existing congressional
authorization procedures and avoid the two- to three-year delay often associated with
those procedures).
60 S. 1692, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S15,346 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981).
0
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during the 97th Congress because the Senate Finance Committee
claimed jurisdiction over its financing provisions and members of
the Public Works Committee were unsuccessful in their attempts
to persuade the Finance Committee to release its hold on the bill.
Senate Bill 1692 proposed major changes in the financing of
future port development work in the direction of greater local responsibility for construction costs. The bill directed new construction dredging to be financed by non-federal interests for all
projects other than those already under construction by the
Corps of Engineers or those being constructed for defense purposes. 6 ' Under the bill, the cost of relocating pipelines, cables and
related facilities affected by the dredging .would have been
shared equally between the pipeline or facility owners and the
non-federal interest responsible for the dredging.62 In requiring
full local funding of port improvement projects, the bill, according to the Public Works Committee, would have allowed the
market, rather than political considerations, to determine the
projects with the highest priority and greatest economic efficiency.6 The Senate report accompanying Senate Bill 1692 noted
a number of financing mechanisms available to local interests,
such as revenue or industrial development bonds or long-term
contracts from port users. 4
In addition, Senate Bill 1692 would have authorized $250
million for each of the next five years to provide funds to the
Corps of Engineers for maintenance dredging harbor projects. 5
But the bill would have required local funds to cover twenty-five
percent of the operation and maintenance costs for each harbor

61 S. 1692, 97th Cong., st sess. § 3 (1981).
62 Id.
63H.R. REP. No. 301, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1981). According to the Committee report, the traditional practice of spreading federal monies broadly, but thinly, among the
nation's ports
thwarts the nation's ability to develop the deep harbors needed to handle the
larger, more cost-effective superships .... It appears highly improbable
that the Federal government will finance work, in any timely manner, on
any of the thirty-four ports that have been identified by the Federal Coal
Export Task Force as potential sites for major coal export harbors.
4 S. REP. No. 301, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1981).
6 S. 1692, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(d) (1981).
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project authorized before January 1, 1981.6 And for projects
authorized after that date, non-federal funds would be required
for fifty percent of the maintenance costs, with no cap on fees
applying to such projects.67 The bill would have authorized ports
to recover some of these funds by imposing user fees, primarily
on those vessels requiring the additional dredging. 6 Finally, Senate Bill 1692 also contained detailed provisions for a two-year
consolidated permitting procedure which would facilitate state,
local and federal agency participation in a joint review process.6
The provisions of Senate Bill 1692 were aimed at developing
a few deep harbors as rapidly as possible. The most notable port
dredging bill considered during the 97th Congress in the House
of Representatives was House Bill 4627, which was formally entitled the Port Development and Navigation Improvement Act of
1982.70 It was directed toward this same goal but concentrated
more on procedural changes which would expedite the permitting process and proposed a less dramatic change in the method
of financing. That bill, along with a number of other bills, was
the focus of a series of hearings before a House subcommittee but
the bill was not reported out of the subcommittee before the 97th
Congress ended.
House Bill 4627 would have provided a "fast-tracek" alternative to the traditional authorization process for deep-draft navigation projects in excess of forty-five feet. 71 The bill differentiated this class of dredging projects from others and provided for
a "generic, procedural reform of the interrelated processes of
authorization,

funding,

construction,

maintenance,... en-

vironmental assessment and regulatory review ' 72 for channel
deepening projects. 3 It also prescribed certain procedural reforms for maintenance dredging programs. These reforms con-

6
67 Id. § 2(a)(1).
1d. § 2(a)(2).
6eId.§5.
69 Id. § 6(b). Section 6 of S. 1692 also includes a time schedule for the various steps in
the permitting procedure.
70 H.R. 4627,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
71 Id. at § 103(a).
72 H.R. REP. No. 454, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1982).
73 H.R. 4627, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981).
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solidated the decision-making process so that pending permit applications would be considered along with the scheduling and
conduct of required maintenance dredging projects by the Corps
of Engineers, on both a port-wide and system-wide basis. 74
House Bill 4627 also authorized a limited system of federal
cost recovery involving a fifty percent local contribution to deepdraft construction costs. 75 Under the bill, local authorities also
would have been responsible for seventy-five percent of the incremental operating and maintenance costs "incurred by the
' And ports
U.S. with respect to the project after construction."76
would have been permitted to levy user fees on a voluntary basis
to help them recover their part of the construction costs.77
A comparison of Senate Bill 169278 and House Bill 462779
reveals that the House bill is more likely, at least in part, to assure as soon as possible that some American ports will be able to
accommodate deep draft ships. However, neither bill was
entirely satisfactory. They failed to recognize the financial pressures upon local governments that have been building in recent
years and that will increase dramatically because of federal budget cuts. In light of these pressures, limitations in both bills on
federal funding of port improvement projects are more likely to
slow, rather than hasten, dredging programs. In refusing to provide a federally funded port dredging program, the bills failed to
recognize that the benefits of port improvements are broader
than those accruing solely to the users of the port. The economic
benefits of dredging projects are regional, not local, in nature.
Jobs would be created not only in industries directly benefitting

74 Id. § 101.
75 Id. § 103(a)(2)(B)(i).
76

Id. § 103(a)(2)(B)(ii); H.R. REP.No. 454, pt. 1,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1982).

77 H.R. 4627, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(c) (1981). The requirements for local con-

tribution to the cost of constructing and maintaining these projects are based upon considerations of: 1) significant regional and national economic benefits attainable through expedited project consideration; 2) prospects for limited federal funding system improvement and maintenance in the future, and 3) requirements for economic justification for
federal investment in those projects by submitting each project to a local market test. H.R.
REP.No. 454, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1982).
78 S. 1692, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
79 H.R. 4627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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from port improvements, but also in supporting industries.
Deepening our harbors to facilitate the exportation of coal
has another frequently overlooked dimension. Enhancing our
coal exports as part of the international effort to increase coal
production and use and to reduce dependency on foreign oil by
our industrialized allies involves security considerations which go
substantially beyond trade-related benefits. In light of these factors, it is appropriate that the federal government fund the major
part of costs associated with the initial dredging and subsequent
maintenance needed to deepen our harbors and thus accommodate the vessels which will be used in future international coal
trade.
B.

Coal Slurry PipelineLegislation

In conjunction with an accelerated dredging program, legislation granting federal eminent domain powers for coal slurry
pipelines could significantly aid our ability to attract foreign
buyers of American coal. Specifically, the construction and operation of coal slurry pipelines stretching from mining centers to
existing ports and perhaps to new deep-water ports could help
solve two problems at once. First, such pipelines would help to
hold down the transportation costs associated with moving coal
from the mines to the ports for export. Second, they would enable importers to use vessels of 100,000 DWT or more for ocean
transport of United States coal by loading the vessels at special
deep-water ports, thereby obviating the need to gain access to
harbor channels.
1. Background
The concept of coal slurry pipelines is not new. Coal slurry
technology was patented in the United States in 1861.80 The technology, which utilizes conventional hydraulic equipment to
transport pulverized coal particles suspended in a fluid such as

80 McDaniel, Commerce Clause and Water Availability Concerning Coal Slurry

Pipelines, 12 NAT. REsouRcEs LAw. 533, 533 (1979).
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water, already has been used successfully twice.8 ' The Black
Mesa Pipeline extends 273 miles from Arizona to Nevada and is
82
presently operating at a level of 4 million tons of coal per year.
The Ohio Pipeline was built to move coal from Cadiz, Ohio, to
Cleveland, Ohio, and did so from 1957 to 1963, when it was
closed.
Eight other pipelines are either planned or proposed,84 and
five of these will be capable of transporting coal for export. 5
Two of the five, the Florida Pipeline (planned by the Florida
Power Company) and the Pacific Bulk Commodity Transportation Pipeline, will be capable of transporting 10 million tons of
coal annually for export. 8 Although slurry loading for coal vessels bound for foreign countries would be new, it already is relied
upon to load other exported minerals."'
One of the central issues in the debate over the wisdom of using slurry pipelines to transport coal has been their cost-effectiveness. 8 Now, however, particularly in light of the passage of the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980,89 it seems beyond question that by providing an alternative form of transportation, construction of coal
slurry pipelines "would create a competitive incentive for the establishment of more realistic rates by railroads."s9 Shippers could
negotiate long-term contracts for rail or slurry coal transporta81 CoAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note

1, at 80.

82 Id.
83

Id.
84 Id. at81.
5 Id. at 80.
8
6 Idat 81. If all of the planned and proposed coal slurry pipelines are built, they
would have the capacity of transporting 20 to 35 million tons of coal per year for export.
Id. While this is by no means an insignificant amount, it represents only a portion of what
is needed to enable the United States to keep pace with export demand over the next 20
years. See Id. at 63-64.
8id.at 80.
8 In a recent study prepared for the Federal Maritime Administration, "it was de-

termined that a model slurry transport system for 10 million tons of coal annually yielded
a life cycle cost 18 to 27 percent lower than conventional dry-bulk system loading." COAL
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 80.
89 Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1981)).
90 Coal Pipeline Act of 1978: Hearingson H.R. 1609 Before the Subcomm. on Sur-

face Transp. of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 97
(1978) (statement of George W. Oprea, Executive Vice-President of Houston Lighting &

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

tion, thereby inducing both railroads and pipelines to lower their
rates in order to compete with each other. 91
One recent study analyzed the anticipated savings in coal
transportation costs for sixteen electric utilities from this predicted competition between railroads and pipelines. 92 Although
the study focused upon the cost savings in moving coal to domestic consumers and not to ports for export, its conclusions are instructive. The study found that construction of a coal slurry pipeline could reduce rail shipment transportation costs by 12 billion
93
real dollars over a twenty-year period.
Although slurry pipelines could reduce transportation costs
and thus lower the price of United States coal, a number of
thorny issues must be resolved to make them feasible. The first
and most obvious is that underground pipelines extending from
the sources of coal reserves to coastal ports must pass through
public and private property. 94 In order to do this, the pipelines
must secure a right-of-way across all this property, some of
which is frequently owned by railroads, which are reluctant to
grant right-of-ways to potential competitors. 95 Thus, a number of
Power Co.). Mr. Oprea's statement is substantiated by the fact that the railroads developed unit train operations cutting rates nearly in half in part in response to the completion of the first slurry pipeline in 1957. See Webber, Coal Slurry Pipelines Are Ready,
Willing, and Unable to Get There, 11 ST. MARTs L.J. 765, 769 (1979-80); Coal Pipeline
Act, Hearingson S. 707 and S. 3046 Before the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5253(1978).
91 In an effort to assure rail carriers that sufficient revenues will be generated by selected traffic for several years without the threat of traffic diversion or of encountering
regulatory intervention, Congress, in the Staggers Rail Act, specifically authorized execution of long-term contracts between shippers and railroads. See 49 U.S.C. § 10713 (Supp.
IV 1981).
92
A.T. Kearney, Inc., Comparison of Projected Rail and Coal Slurry Pipeline Rates
for Transporting Coal to Selected Southeast Utilities (May 1981) (prepared for Coalstream
Pipeline
93 Co.).
Id. at 16.
94 Federal legislation which would have given eminent domain powers to coal pipelines was defeated in 1978. 124 CONC. REC. H6971 (daily ed. July 19, 1978). Some states,
however, have granted eminent domain power to coal pipelines. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30: 721-23 (West Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-190 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §
49-19-12 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-1 (1981).
9' For example, the proposed Energy Transportation Systems Inc. coal pipeline from
Arkansas to Gillette, Wyoming, must pass under the tracks of nine railroads at 48 crossings. Only one of the nine agreed to grant a right of way. 122 CONC. REc. 22455 (1976)
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the proposed coal slurry pipelines simply cannot be built unless
they are granted the power of eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the power to take private property for
public use.9 As "an attribute of sovereignty," eminent domain
"appertains to every independent government." 97 Therefore,
both state and federal governments may exercise that power. 98
Moreover, it has long been settled that eminent domain powers
may be delegated to private corporations which provide a public
service or advance the public interest. 99

There is little question that Congress may grant federal eminent domain powers to coal slurry pipeline companies as a means
of reducing the transportation costs that inflate the price of
American coal. 10 The dispute instead has centered upon whether
Congress should do so, and if so, how it should be done.
The second major problem associated with coal slurry pipelines is that their operation requires considerable amounts of
water. As much as 250 gallons of water may be needed to transport each ton of coal. 101 At the same time, water is often a scarce

commodity, particularly in the West. In response to this scarcity,
state water laws often make it extremely difficult for newcomers
to gain access to sources of water. In considering coal slurry pipe-

(remarks of Rep. Baucus). Rep. Baucus stated that "the remaining railroads have refused
permits to prevent the slurry competition." Id.
Whether the railroads can prevent acquisition of underground rights-of-way
across rail lines, at least in the Western United States, may be open to question after decisions in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. In Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pac.
R.R., 619 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980), and Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pac.
R.R., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979), the courts held that the rights-of-way given to Western railroads under the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862 granted surface easements only and
did not convey title to the subsurface. In the Eastern United States, however, many (f the
railroads may hold their rights-of-way in fee, giving them title to both the surface and subsurface lands. H.R. REP. No. 692, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979). See, e.g., Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
96
See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946); U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
97 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1879).
98 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
99 See Noble v. Oklahoma City, 297 U.S. 481 (1936); Luxton v. North River Bridge
Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1895).
100 COAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supranote 1, at 15.
101 Johnston & Schneider, Coal Slurry Pipelines: An Economic and Political Dilemma, 48 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 24, 26 (1980).
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line legislation, the water issue has been a particularly troublesome one for Congress.
2.

LegislativeInitiatives

Congress has debated the coal slurry pipeline issue repeatedly
since President John F. Kennedy originally suggested legislation
on this topic in 1962. During the 97th Congress, pipeline advocates came closer than ever before to bringing a bill to a floor
vote in both houses. As the lame duck session of the 97th Congress ended, there were frantic but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to bring slurry pipeline bills to a vote in both the House and
the Senate.
The Coal Distribution and Utilization Act of 1982,102 Senate
Bill 1844, was favorably reported out of the Senate Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources on August 5, 1982.10 Representative Morris Udall of Arizona introduced similar legislation, the
Coal Pipeline Act of 1981, House Bill 4230, in the House on July
22, 1981.104 This bill was referred jointly to the House Committee
on Interior Affairs, which reported it out on December 8, 1981,
and to the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, which reported its own bill out on July 29, 1982. Both versions of House Bill 4230 were in agreement on almost all issues'03
and are virtually identical to the legislation introduced by Representative Udall in July of 1981. As the 97th Congress ended,
House Bill 4230 was awaiting action before the House Rules
Committee.
The basic purpose of both the House and Senate Bills was "to
establish a mechanism through which the Federal power of emi-

102 S. 1844, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
103 S. 1844, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. D 1027 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1982).
104 H.R. 4230, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H4759 (daily ed. July 22,

1981).
105 The Public Works and Transportation version differs from the Interior Committee's bill "by clearly defining the pipeline's obligation to shippers where the pipeline elects

to provide service pursuant to contracts and by establishing statutory guidelines for such
contracts." H.R. REP. No. 423, pt. 2, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982). These two versions of
H.R. 4230 were not merged during the 97th Congress. Where the bills differ, the text
identifies the version being discussed.
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nent domain may be exercised by coal slurry pipelines."' 1 6 Senate
Bill 1844 would have authorized the Secretary of Energy to grant
the power of eminent domain to "acquire rights-of-way over,
under, upon, or through private lands"' 0 7 to applicants proposing
to construct an interstate coal pipeline distribution system which
the Secretary determines is in the "national interest."' 0 In making this- determination, the Secretary would have been required
to consider, among other things, whether the proposed pipeline
would meet "national needs for coal distribution and utilization
considering.., alternate routes, or means of distributing
coal"'1 and whether it would "enhance competition and provide
new market outlets and opportunities for coal producers.""10
Senate Bill 1844 directed the Attorney General to conduct an
antitrust review of any application to the Secretary of Energy
and provided for written comments from any state in which the
proposed system would be located or which it would affect."'
Unlike the House Bill, Senate Bill 1844 required that the owner
of the pipeline compensate the federal government for the "fair
market value" of any federal coal precluded from being re2
covered as a result of the proposed distribution system.
Under the House Bill, coal pipeline companies were authorized to acquire federal eminent domain powers entitling them to
obtain a right-of-way under or across private land through issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the
ICC. The ICC was chosen as the certifying authority in the
House version because of its expertise in transportation matters.
The standards established in both House versions for issuance of
such certificates virtually assured that most applicants would be
successful; under the House Interior Commission version of the
bill, the ICC would have been required to issue a certificate if it
found that "the present or future public convenience and neces-

106 H.R. REP. No. 423, pt. 2, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).
107 S. 1844, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e) (1981).
108 Id.

109 Id.§ 4(b)(1).
"1o Id. § 4(b)(2).
il' Id. § 4(d).
112 Id. § 4(q)(2)(C).
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sity require or will be enhanced by construction, operation, and
maintenance of the coal pipeline." 3 The House Public Works
Committee version of the bill merely required that the ICC find
"public convenience and necessity" and that the applicant be
"fit, willing, and able""' to construct and operate a pipeline.
Once a certificate was secured, the House Bill provided that coal
pipeline companies would apply to the Secretary of the-Interior

for a right-of-way under or across federal lands. 115 Applications
for such rights-of-way, as well as the decision of the Secretary of

the Interior whether to grant them,"' were to be governed by the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.117 Finally,
unlike Senate Bill 1844, both House versions of House Bill 4230
would also have required that a pipeline system be built under-

113 H.R. at 4230 § 5, amending 49 U.S.C. § 10952(b) (Supp. IV 1981) (House Interior Comm. Bill) (emphasis added).
114H.R. 4230 at § 5, amending 49 U.S.C. § 10952(a) (Supp. IV 1981) (House Public
Works Comm. Bill).
115 The Outer Continental Shelf, which generally extends three miles out to sea, is
excluded from the definition of "federal lands." H.R. 4230, 97th Cong., 1st Sess § 3(3)
(1981). See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(2), 1331(a) (1976). However, coal slurry pipelines, to be
connected to a deep-water port where a vessel of any size can be accommodated, may
need to extend beyond the mainland and across the Outer Continental Shelf. This means
pipelines need to secure rights-of-way across the Outer Continental Shelf pursuant to the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1981).
Under that Act, the Secretaries of Interior and Transportation are authorized to grant
rights-of-way "through the submerged lands of the Outer Continental Shelf... for pipeline purposes for the transportation of oil, natural gas, sulphur, or other minerals ...."
Id. § 1334(e) (emphasis added). Applications for pipeline rights-of-way are governed by
43 C.F.R. §§ 3340.2-1, 3340.2-2 (1981). Construction of deep-water ports for coal slurry
pipelines could require amendment of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1501
(1976). That Act, dealing only with oil, authorizes the construction of deep-water ports
beyond the territorial limits of the United States. Id. § 1501(a)(1). It was enacted for the
same reason that deepwater ports are needed for coal export purposes: the supertankers
used for oceanborne transport of oil could not gain access to shallow United States ports. S.
REP. No. 1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
116 See H.R. 4230, 97th Cong., 1st sess. § 7(a) (1981). This Act specifically
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant a right-of-way over, upon, under or
through federal land for "pipelines, slurry and emulsion systems." 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(3)
(1976). The criteria for issuance of the right-of-way include whether the applicant has the
"technical and financial capability to construct the project for which the right-of-way is
requested." Id. § 1764(j). The rental payments for grant of the right-of-way must reflect
its fair market value, as determined by the Secretary. Id. § 1764(g).
117 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
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ground "to the maximum extent practicable." ' fi s
The most volatile questions addressed by the House and Senate Committees during the 97th Congress' consideration of slurry
pipeline legislaton were the closely-linked issues of water resources and states rights. Although both the House and Senate
Committees took great pains in their coal slurry pipeline bills to
establish the primacy of state water law, the provisions of those
bills left many Senators and Representatives dissatisfied.
Much of the concern about the water issue centered upon
speculation that legislation granting the right of eminent domain
to pipeline companies would give them an advantage in seeking
water rights in court. Opponents of coal slurry pipelines argued
that, armed with federal certificates, the pipeline companies
would claim that the federal government had already determined that the pipeline was in the public interest and that their
requests for water rights also must serve the public interest. Both
the House and Senate Bills sought to foreclose the opportunity for
such an argument by specifically barring the use of eminent domain to acquire water. Senate Bill 1844 stated that "nothing in
this section shall be construed to permit any person to acquire
any right to take, use, dispose of, or develop water through exercise of the power of eminent domain,"'' n and both House versions
of House Bill 4230 contained a similar prohibition. 20

118 H.R. 4230 at 9 5, amending 49 U.S.C. ch. 109 (Supp. IV 1980) (Comm. on Public Works and Transportation bill); H.R. 4230 at § 5, amending49 U.S.C. ch. 109 (Supp.

IV 1980) (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs bill).
", S. 1844, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e)(2) (1981).
120 H.R. 4230, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1981) amending 49 U.S.C. § 10951(b)
(1976). Opponents of coal slurry pipeine legislation fear that it will enable the federal government to preempt state water law as an incident to federal control of interstate commerce. Support for this view is found in the report prepared by the Office of Technology
assessment (OTA) in response to Congress' request in 1977. OTA asserts that the com-

merce and property clauses of the Constitution provide the federal government "ample
power... to assure adequate water supplies to a coal slurry pipeline, State restrictions
notwithstanding." CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT OF COAL SLURRY PIPELINES 19 (Sept. 1980) [hereinafter cited as TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT]. However, even without an explicit disclaimer in pipeline legislation that

state water law is controlling, it is by no means clear that federal power extends as far as
OTA suggests. See, e.g., United States v. Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); California v.

United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). As noted above, H.R. 4230 makes clear that the authority granted under the bill
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Pipeline opponents also questioned the wisdom of passing
legislation requiring water intensive technology such as slurry
pipelines which, unlike other water users, do not return water to
the area from which it came and put an additional strain on the
already limited water resources in some areas of the country. A
1978 study by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment concluded that slurry pipeline water use threatened agriculture and could foreclose the future development of some regions.' 2' In all the pipeline origin areas studied except one, estimated water needs from 1985 to 2000 will exceed supply.'2 The
study urged consideration of the possible displacement of future
uses of water in enacting coal slurry legislation. 23
The controversy over the application of state water law was
fueled by an agreement between the Energy Transportation System, Inc. (ETSI) and the State of South Dakota which permitted
ETSI to use 15,000 to 20,000 acre-feet per year of ground water
from the Madison aquifer system, which underlies more than one
state, for operation of the proposed ETSI pipeline. 24 While ETSI
subsequently changed its plans and agreed to use surface water
instead, states have been spurred to seek new ways to legally protect shared water supplies from actions taken by neighboring
states.'21
Opponents of coal pipeline legislation further argue that the
current status of constitutional law in this area is unsettled, possibly subjecting the state water rights provisions of any federal
coal slurry pipeline legislation to future judicial interpretation.
As a result, the most recent United States Supreme Court decision in the area of state water rights and the commerce clause,
Sporhase v. Nebraska,i26 has been extensively debated within the
Senate and House Committees considering that legislation.

cannot be used to displace state water law. In light of this clear expression of congressional
intent, it is unlikely that a court wodid allow such pr-onntions. See Sporhase v. Nebraska,
102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982);"California v. United States,438 U.S. at 675.
121 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supranote 120.
22
1 Id.
123Id.
"4

See H.R. REP. No. 423, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982).

125See id.
12

102 S. Ct. at 3456.
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Sporhaseinvolved the State of Nebraska's requirement that a
permit be obtained for the transport of water to an adjoining
state. 12 The defendants were two individuals who own contiguous tracts of land in Nebraska and Colorado which they irrigated with ground water from a well on the Nebraska side. According to Nebraska law, a permit may be granted if the state in
which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights for withdrawal of ground water from that state for use in Nebraska.'2
The Supreme Court, in declaring Nebraska's permit requirement unconstitutional, held that groundwater "is an an article of
commerce" and therefore subject to congressional regulation,'21
and concluded tliat Congress has not declared an intent to defer
to state law that relates to the export of water to nonreciprocating states.13 In reaching its decision, the Court stated that congressional "'intent and policy' to sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause? must be "'expressly
stated.' "131
While the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
reported out House Bill 4230 prior to the Sporhase decision, the
Committee on Public Works and Transportation had the opportunity to discuss the bill in the context of the Supreme Court
opinion.132 That Committee noted that the language in its bill
which addressed the water rights question clearly expressed the
intent to sustain state legislation from attack under the commerce clause.13 Indeed, the Public Works and Transportation
Committee specifically incorporated language into House Bill
4230 clarifying that adherence to state substantive and procedural water law was paramount. House Bill 4230, as reported by
the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, made
this point crystal clear by stating that "authorizations for the reservation, appropriation, use or diversion of water for a certificated coal pipeline shall be determined pursuant to State law
127 Id. at 3458.
'18Id.
"9 Id. at 3463.
130 Id. at 3465-66.

131 Id. at 3466 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,427(1946)).
132 H.R. REP. No. 4230, pt. 2,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1982).
'13 Id. at7.
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notwithstanding any transportation, use, or disposal of such
water in interstate commerce." 1
House Bill 4230 struck a politically astute balance on this crucial water rights issue. The bill affirmed in unequivocal terms
that state law will control access to water for coal slurry pipelines
and that federal action in facilitating construction and operation
of such pipelines cannot be used or interpreted to supplant state
water laws. Yet it avoided the excesses of previous legislationss
calculated to obstruct rather than promote construction and op136
eration of coal slurry pipelines.
Senate Bill 1844 went even further than House Bill 4230 in
clearly establishing the primacy of state water.law in order to
comply with the Sporhase language on congressional exercise of

134 H.R. 4230 at 10(b).
I3 For example, § 102(h) of H.R. 4370, as reported by the Committee on Public

Works and Transportation in the 96th Congress, prohibited the issuance of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity unless each state having a legal interest in any groundwater aquifer to be used by the pipeline for water consented to such use. Other legislation
introduced during the 97th Congress also would have made the grant of a right-of-way
across federal lands conditional upo'n the consent of each state to use of groundwater
aquifer beneath the surface of its land. See S. 1527, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
S8658 (daily ed. July 28, 1981).
The existence of aquifers-underground water sources that often lie beneath
more than one state-poses delicate water rights questions. For example, if one state
grants a pipeline company the right to tap into an aquifer that also underlies another state,
as was the case in the agreement between Energy Transportation System, Inc. and the
State of South Dakota, the result may be a depletion in water supplies in the second state
without benefit to or even knowledge of the residents of that state. In hearings held before
the House Interior Committee on July 30, 1981, the interlocking water resources of many
Western states were the focus of extended discussion. See also 1 FINAL ENViRONmENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE ENERGY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC. COAL SLURRY PIPELINE

TRANSPORTATION PROJECT, BLM (July 17, 1981), Vol. 1, at 2-4. It is likely that these

common water problems can best be managed, as Rep. Udall stated during the July 1981
hearings, through interstate compacts. See Hearingson H.R. 4230, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
5-316 (July 30, 1981). Certainly this solution would be far more palatable to the states
than federal intervention in water rights law.
136 For example, an amendment was defeated in the Surface Transportation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation which would
have prohibited a state from selling or transferring water to a pipeline without an interstate agreement if the water came from a river or aquifer shared with another state.
Another amendment proposed in that Subcommittee would have conditioned the granting
of a certificate upon a finding by the Secretary of Agriculture that the diversion of water
would not damage existing or future agricultural needs. Panel Tries to Force Coal Slurry
Agreement, 40 CONG. Q. 717, 745 (1982).
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commerce clause power. The Senate Bill stated that "the need for
a national coal distribution system is subservient to the national

interest in the primacy of state water law and interstate compacts on the allocation of water."'3 It required pipeline companies to obtain water permits before applying for authority
from the Secretary of Energy to exercise the right of eminent domain.'18
While legislation such as House Bill 4230 and Senate Bill
1844 is a necessary prerequisite to constructing and operating
coal slurry pipelines in time to keep coal transportation costs
competitive and increase coal exports, pipeline legislation faces
difficulty, not only because of the troublesome water rights issue
but also because of Administration opposition to such legislation.
The Administration's position centers on the "state rights" argument that granting the right of eminent domain would be an unwarranted extension of federal authority contrary to the Administration's concept of federalism. In a November 16, 1981,
memorandum to Secretary of the Interior James Watt, President
Reagan expressed his opposition to legislation granting coal
slurry pipelines the power of eminent domain.19 Thus, there was
concern that even if the 97th Congress had passed slurry pipeline
legislation, it would have been vetoed by the President.
CONCLUSION

The United States stands to be a principal beneficiary of the
expansion in world coal trade which will occur during this decade and beyond. But in order to be competitive in an increasingly
price-conscious world market and maintain its position as the
leading exporter of coal, the United States must make a national
commitment to eliminate the constraints which threaten that
position. We must make it easier and cheaper to mine the coal
needed to supply the world market. We must undertake a crash
program of port dredging and improvements which has the com-

S. 1844, 97th Cong., 1stSess. § 2(A)(a) (1981).
13 Id. § 4(a).
139
Pipeline Backers OrchestratePushfor Coal Slurry Proposals, 40 CONG. Q 564,
566(1982).
'f
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bined financial support of the federal government and private industry. We must enact federal legislation to stimulate the coal
slurry pipeline industry in order to contribute to the development
of a competitive inland transportation system that ensures the
lowest possible costs of moving coal from mines to ports.
The success of each of these efforts is inextricably tied to the
collective success of all. The establishment of a coal slurry pipeline industry with export capability cannot compensate for failure to dredge our ports to the depth needed to accommodate
deep-draft vessels which will dominate ocean transport in the
years to come. A port dredging program cannot by itself reduce
the transportation costs that reflect the absence of competition
and which inflate the price of United States coal.

